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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
vs. 
WILLIAM GARCIA-SANCHEZ 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20060453-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A CONVICTION OF UNLAWFUL DETENTION, A 
CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the record of defendant's trial, despite the gap in the trial record 
containing Defendant's testimony, was sufficient to lead a jury to conclude that the 
defendant was guilty of unlawful detention. State of Utah v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ^ f 24, 
167 P.3d 1074. "When conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review, it is the duty of 
1 
the reviewing appellate court to perform its review in the context of the whole record, or at 
least that portion of the record to which its attention was drawn by the appellant's 
marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's marshaled evidence.... 
this duty presumes that an intact record exists. It is nevertheless appropriate in the face of a 
defective record for an appellate court to honor certain credible assumptions relating to the 
conduct of the trial, including the assumption that the jury believed evidence supporting its 
verdict and discounted conflicting evidence." Id. at If 24. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-304 is set forth in Appellee's 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee agrees with appellant's statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 23, 2004, Johana Evans and her husband, Matthew Evans, were at Brent 
Brown Automotive in Provo looking for a new car (R.154: 68 and R. 154:132). Johana 
Evans left her husband at Brent Brown Automotive so she could be at work at Convergys 
in Orem by 4:00 p.m. Johana could not miss work because it was a new job and she was in 
training. (R.154: 69 and R.154:132). 
Johana Evens went home to her apartment at Parkside Apartments, 680 North 500 
West, Provo to get her purse and training books. (R.154: 70-72). It was a typical summer 
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day, daylight with no obstruction to her sight of what she was seeing. She parked in the 
apartment complex underground parking lot and climbed up the stairs to her third floor 
apartment. The stairs face 500 West where there is a view of auto and pedestrian traffic on 
500 West. (R.154: 58-59 and R.154: 71). 
As Johana left her apartment for work and was walking toward the stairwell on the 
third floor, she noticed a Hispanic male wearing a blue bandana and a tan shirt walking on 
the sidewalk approximately 12 feet from the stairwell. (R.154: 72-73). Johana could 
identify him as Hispanic because she is Hispanic and she grew up in a California town that 
was Hispanic. (R.154: 72). When she reached the second level of the stairwell, she noticed 
the same man coming up the stairs. His appearance made her "uneasy." (R:154: 72). She 
was shocked and scared because she knew that he did not live in the building. (R.154: 73-
74). As Johana and the Hispanic male passed each other on the stairs he grabbed her arm 
around the elbow very tightly with a firm grip. She could not move. She had to struggle 
and pull away to force herself out of his grip. (R.154: 74). She was held for approximately 
one minute while the man was grinning at her before she could break his grip on her arm. 
(R.154: 75). 
Johana hurried down the stairs to the parking garage while the man continued up 
the stairs (R.154: 76). As she approached her car, with her car keys in her hand, she 
looked back and saw the same man directly behind her. He grabbed her a second time, 
tightly holding her from behind the right arm with other arm around her right hip below 
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her purse. (R.154: 77-IS). He did not attempt to take her purse or assault her. (R.154: 60, 
78, 96). Johana identified the defendant in open court as the man who grabbed her on both 
occasions. (R.154: 76, 102). 
Johana, knowing that she had to break free, instinctively kicked backwards with the 
heel of her left foot towards his leg and made contact with his kneecap or higher on his 
leg. (R.154: 79). She was able to see him for a couple of minutes when she turned during 
this the jury. (R.154: 79). 
After Johana freed herself by kicking the man, she opened her car with the keyless 
entry, got in, and quickly shut and locked the doors. (R.154: 80). At this time, she was so 
scared that she "froze up" for a few seconds not knowing what to do. (R154: 80-81). 
The same man started banging on the driver's side window with his fists and a lot 
of force. Johana observed the man for a few seconds before she put the car in reverse, 
backed out, and drove away. Johana again identified the defendant as being the man that 
was banging on her driver's side window. (R.154: 81-82). The man never spoke to Johana 
(R.154: 84). There was nobody else present on the stairwell or in the garage at the time of 
the incident. (R.154:84). 
Johana proceeded down 500 West to work. When she stopped at the traffic light at 
800 North she could see the same man with the blue bandana on his head walking toward 
the hospital in her review mirror. (R.154: 82,83). The entire incident happened over two to 
three minutes. (R.154: 100). Johana could not see much of his brown hair because he was 
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wearing a bandana. She could see his face, brown eyes, his nose, mouth, everything about 
his face. (R. 154: 104). 
While driving to work, Johana called her husband, Matthew Evans, who was still at 
Brent Brown Automotive; Matthew is a police officer, and her first instinct was to call 
him. Johana was frantic, panicked, and upset as she told Matthew what had happened to 
her. (R154: 83,133,134). Matthew told her he would call the police and then call her back 
to let her know what they want her to do. Matthew was taken home by one of the 
employees at the automotive dealership. Provo City Police Officer Drew Hubbard was 
dispatched to respond to 680 North 500 West and talked with Matthew Evans. (R.154: 
135,140). Officer Hubbard called Johana at work and asked her to come to the police 
station for an interview. (R154: 84, 135). She told Officer Hubbard, on the telephone 
about the assault and described her assailant as a Hispanic male, darker complected in his 
20fs to 30fs, around five-foot-seven to five-foot-eleven, wearing a blue bandana and beige 
shirt. (R.154: 142-143). Johana then went home and her husband and she went to the 
police station to meet with Detective Weidinger. (R154: 86-87,136). 
Johana told Detective Weidinger about the assault and described her assailant as a 
Hispanic male, very skinny, about five-foot-six, just a few inches taller than her, wearing a 
blue bandana, with a tan or beige shirt with long sleeves that were frayed and a frayed 
collar. She described the man as being scruffy looking. (R.154: 153). 
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An appointment was made for Johana to meet with Karen Mean, the sketch artist, 
the following day. (R.154: 153). After the sketch was made, Officer Weidinger made a 
copy for his report so that it could be disseminated to various news agencies. He also gave 
a copy to Johana to give to her manager so they could distribute it throughout the 
apartment complex. (R.154: 155). 
Officer Weidinger received several calls when the follow up did not lead to 
anything. (R.154: 156). Officer Weidinger received a phone call from a male who did not 
want to identify himself and get too involved. Officer Weidinger was told that William 
Garcia-Sanchez was the man he needed to talk to and gave him an address at 247 North 
500 West, Provo, within six blocks of Johana Evans' apartment. (R.154: 156-157). 
Officer Weidinger attempted to contact the suspect and found the name of William 
Garcia-Sanchez on one of the mailboxes. The suspect was not home. Officer Weidinger 
left a business card and a request to be contacted in the suspect's doorway. (R154: 157). 
Officer Weidinger received a telephone call from William Garcia-Sanchez and met 
with him at his home. (R.154: 158). Officer Weidinger told him that the case he was 
investigating was regarding an assault or possible abduction and William Garcia-Sanchez 
became defensive. He stated that the victim was a possible racist. Officer Weidinger told 
him that the victim, Johana Evans, appeared to also be Hispanic. Officer Weidinger asked 
if he could come in and look around the residence and he allowed the officer to come in. 
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Officer Weidinger looked around and was not able to find the blue bandana or beige shirt. 
(R.154: 159). 
Afterwards, Officer Weidinger contacted the Driver's License Division and 
requested a copy of a photo of William Garcia-Sanchez, which was e-mailed to him. 
(R.154: 160). Officer Weidinger received the photo and put together a photo lineup. 
(R.154: 161). Officer Weidinger contacted Johana and she came in and looked at the photo 
lineup. (R.154: 162). She identified photo number 3, William Garcia-Sanchez as the 
person who attacked her based on the his eyes. (R.154: 163, 190). Nobody said anything to 
her as she looked at the photos. (R.154: 109). Officer Weidinger informed her that she 
picked out their suspect. (R.154: 89-90,109). Officer Weidinger identified William Garcia-
Sanchez, in the court room, as the person he spoke to at the residence. (R.154: 164). 
Johana identified William Garcia-Sanchez in the court room, a few weeks prior to 
trial at a time when the court room was full of people, as the same man who grabbed onto 
her, held her, and detained her in the garage.(R.154: 90). 
The record of the trial minutes indicate that Williams Garcia-Sanchez testified. 
However, the tape was turned off at 2:49 to 3:20:56 and his testimony was not recorded. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to due process and a record that is 
sufficient and adequate to allow for a meaningful judicial review. When there is a gap in 
the trial court record causing the record to be incomplete does not always entitle a 
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defendant to a new trial unless the defendant shows that a specific error is asserted and the 
missing record was critical to resolving it. 
When an appellate court is conducting a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
it is the responsibility of the reviewing court to review the context of the whole record or 
the portion of the record to which its "attention was drawn by the appellant's marshaling 
obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's marshaled evidence." State v. 
Gardner, 2007 UT 70, \ 24 167 P.3d 1074 (quoting S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, f 39, 147 
P.3d 401). When reviewing an incomplete record, it is appropriate for the appellate court 
to observe assumptions that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict and 
discounted conflicting evidence. 
The appellate court's standard of review for reviewing eyewitness identification 
testimony is a correctness standard. It is the responsibility of the judge to determine 
whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury and to 
provide the jury with special cautionary instructions when eyewitness identification is a 
crucial issue to the verdict. It is the responsibility of the jury to decide how much weight to 
give the testimony of eyewitness identification and to determine if the evidence presented 
to the jury was sufficient and substantive evidence to support its verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED SUFFICIENT SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT A JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY DESPITE THE GAP IN THE 
RECORD CONTAINING THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY 
SUFFICIENCY OF RECORD TO SUPPORT JURY VERDICT 
"Criminal defendants have the right to a 'record of sufficient completeness to 
permit proper consideration of [their] claims.' They do not, however, have a right to a 
perfect transcript. Rather, the record must be adequate to allow meaningful judicial 
review." State v. Gardner, 2006 UT App 21; 2006 Utah App. Lexis 53 (quoting State v. 
Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 241 (Utah 1992). (Addendum). 
"Due process requires that there be a record adequate to review specific claims of 
error already raised." State v. Gardner, 2006 UT App 21, ^2; 2006 Utah App. Lexis 
(quoting West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, Tfl 1, 993 P.2d 252.) "Appellate 
courts will not presume error where a record is incomplete. A lack of a complete record 
will be a basis for remand and a new hearing only where: (1) the absence or 
incompleteness of the record prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other documentary evidence); and (3) 
the appellant timely requests the relevant portion of the record." Id. at ^|2. 
"An incomplete record may necessitate a new trial where a defendant shows that a 
specific error is asserted and that the missing record was critical to its resolution." State 
v. Gardner, 2006 UT App 21,^2; 2006 Utah App. Lexis (quoting State v. Russell, 917 
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P.2d 557, 559). "A defendant is not entitled to a new trial whenever there is a gap in the 
record, just in case the missing record might reveal some error. Rather, a showing of 
prejudice is required." Id. at f2. 
William Garcia-Sanchez asserts that due process requires that he be granted a new 
trial because he is deprived a meaningful constitutional appellate review without a record 
of his testimony at the trial court. He further suggests that this Court should reverse his 
conviction. William Garcia-Sanchez has not shown how his unrecorded testimony in the 
trial court has prejudiced him. 
"An appellate court may overturn a criminal conviction for insufficiency of 
evidence only 'when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to 
each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant committed the crime.'" State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, \ 24, 167 P.3d 
1074 (quoting State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 13, 25 P.3d 985). 
"When conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review, it is the duty of the 
reviewing appellate court to perform its 'review in the context of the whole record, or at 
least that portion of the record to which its attention was drawn by the appellant's 
marshaling obligation or the appellee's response to the appellant's marshaled evidence." 
State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, If 24, 167 P.3d 1074 (quoting S.B.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 
\ 39, 147 P.3d 401). "This duty presumes that an intact record exists. It is nevertheless 
appropriate in the face of a defective record for an appellate court to honor certain 
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credible assumptions relating to the conduct of the trial, including the assumption that 
the jury believed evidence supporting its verdict and discounted conflicting evidence." 
State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ^ 24, 167 P.3d 1074 (quoting State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 
114,25 P.3d 985). 
The Utah Supreme Court holds that "it is not an error to conduct a sufficiency of 
the evidence review when a piece of the record is missing. If an appellant's best case is 
that he elicited contradictory evidence that is missing from the record,.. . then an 
appellate court can rely on the presumption that the jury disbelieved the evidence in 
conflict with the jury verdict and find that there is evidence sufficient to support the 
jury's findings." State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, % 25, 167 P.3d 1074. 
In State v. Gardner, the cross-examination testimony of a key witness for the 
prosecution was missing from the record due to a recording malfunction. Gardner argued 
that the testimony of this witness was key to the success of his entrapment defense and 
without it he could not receive a constitutionally adequate appeal. The State countered 
with a motion to reconstruct the record with the court of appeals and it was granted. 
After the record was reconstructed the appeal returned to the court of appeals. The Court 
of Appeals decided the appeal without referring to the reconstructed record, holding that 
it did not need to consider the'witnesses testimony because it was impeachment evidence 
and irrelevant to an appeal based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The 
Utah Supreme Court agreed with that is impeachment evidence rather than substantive 
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evidence, it is appropriate for an appellate court to decide the case without reference to 
the reconstructed record. "Under these circumstances, the appellate court may rely on the 
presumption that the jury properly took into account conflicting evidence and believed 
the evidence that supported the verdict." Id. at |^4. 
This case is analogous to Gardner with the exception that the missing testimony is 
the defendant's. The defendant did testify before the jury, but there was a recording 
malfunction resulting in the defendant's testimony not being recorded on the trial court 
record. It is presumed that the jury took into account the defendant's conflicting 
testimony and believed that the prosecution presented sufficient substantive evidence 
with the testimony of Johana Evans, Officer Hubbard, and Detective Weidinger that 
supported the verdict of guilty of unlawfully detaining Johana Evans. Id. at *f 2n 
The victim, Johana Evans, clearly saw the man that held and detained her twice 
during the incident for a period of two to three minutes. (R.154: 98-100). She clearly saw 
the defendant when he was banging on her driver's side window while she was seated in 
the driver's seat. (R.154: 81-82). Johana described the man to a police sketch artist 
(R.154: 153) and identified him in a photo lineup. (R.154: 161). Johana Evans identified, 
in a courtroom setting, William Garcia-Sanchez as the man that held and detained 
several weeks prior to the trial (R. 154:90) and again during the trial (R.154: 76,102). 
Detective Weidinger received a phone call from an anonymous caller stating that 
William Garcia-Sanchez was the man he needed to talk to in regard to this incident 
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(R.154: 156-17). When Detective Weidinger met with William Garcia-Sanchez at his 
home and told him about the incident, the defendant became very defensive. (R.154: 
158-159). Furthermore, Detective Weidinger got the defendant's picture from the 
Driver's License Division and included it in a photo lineup in which the victim, Johana 
Evans, identified the defendant as the man that held and detained her. (R.154: 160-163). 
Detective Weidinger identified William Garcia-Sanchez, in the court room, as the person 
he spoke to at the residence. (R.154:164). In sum, the evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty of unlawfully detaining Johana Evans. 
Should the Court find that the evidence in the record is not sufficient for review 
the record can be reconstructed with the prosecutor's notes and the trial court judge 
would be notified for review of her trial notes. 
JURY WEIGHS THE CREDIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
"The standard for reviewing a trial court's decision to admit eyewitness 
identification testimony requires [an appellate court] to consider the record evidence and 
determine whether the admission of the identification is consistent with the due process 
guarantees of U.S. Const, amend. XIV, and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7". State v. Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45, T|22, 48 P.3d 953 also see State v. Guzman, 2004 UT APP 211, If 11, 95 P. 
3d 302. An appellate court's review "employs a correctness standard, which incorporates 
a clearly erroneous standard for the review of subsidiary factual determinations. This 
standard of review applies to both federal and state due process analysis." State v. 
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Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, \ 11, 95 P. 3d 302 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774,782 n.3 (Utah 1991)). "Balancing of the probative value against any prejudicial 
effect must necessarily rest within the sound discretion of the trial court; and the 
determination it makes thereon should not be disturbed on appeal unless there is clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. at \\2 (quoting State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Utah 
1977)). 
"A trial court's giving of a special cautionary instruction [regarding eyewitness 
identification] relating to corroborated accomplice testimony is entirely discretionary 
with the trial court, and [an appellate court] will reverse only when it has abused that 
discretion." Id. at \tt (quoting State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780,782 (Utah 1986) also see 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)). The Utah Supreme Court has concluded 
that failure to give a cautionary instruction, when eyewitness identification is a crucial 
issue, would deny a defendant due process of law under Utah Const, art. I, §7. Id. at Tf 21 
(quoting State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986)). 
"[T]he trial court, in its gatekeeping function, determines whether proffered 
evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury for their 
deliberation and it is the role of the jury to decide how much weight to give the 
testimony of particular witnesses." State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, f 30, 95 P. 3d 
302. "A judge, as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility of an identification, is 
required to scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects. The judge must 
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preliminarily determine whether the identification is sufficiently reliable that its 
admission and consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due process. Then, if 
reliable and therefore admissible, the jury determines the credibility of that 
identification." State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, \ 15, 95 P. 3d 302 (quoting State v. 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 940,943 (Utah Ct App. 1997) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774,778 (Utah 1991))). 
"The Utah Supreme Court has itemized areas [Long factors] of concern that 
should be addressed in determining reliability under Utah due process analysis: (1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and metal acuity; (4) whether the witness 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it 
was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly."/^/, at f 18 
(quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
In this case, the defendant's constitutional right to due process was not denied 
with the admission of Johana Evans witness identification and the jury's determination 
of the credibility in regard to her witness identification. "It is well documented that 
identifications tend to be more accurate where the person observing and the one being 
observed are the same race." State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 489 n.4 (Utah 1986). Both the 
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victim, Johana Evans, and William Garcia- Sanchez are Hispanic. (R.154: 72-73). 
Johana Evans saw William Garcia-Sanchez's face for two to three minutes when he was 
coming toward her on the stairwell, (R.154: 72-73), when he held and detained her twice 
(R.154: 74, 77-78), and when he was banging on her driver's side window while she was 
seated in the driver's seat. (R.154: 81-82). Her attention was on the man holding her and 
detaining her for there was no one else in the garage. (R.154: 113). 
In this case, Judge Laycock gave the jury special cautionary instructions for the 
jury to use when they weighed the testimony and credibility of the eyewitness testimony 
that identified the defendant of allegedly committing the crime. (R.154: 180-183). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
verdict finding William Garcia-Sanchez guilty of unlawful detention. 
DATED this of November, 2007. 
STEPHEN H. SCHREINER 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-304 
State v. Gardner, 2006 UT App 21; 2006 Utah App. Lexis 53 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 
Page 1 
1 of 20 DOCUMENTS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL 
15, 2007 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 3. KIDNAPPING 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (2007) 
§ 76-5-304. Unlawful detention 
(1) An actor commits unlawful detention if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against 
the will of the victim, detains or restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of: 
(a) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1\ or 
(c) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes acting without the consent of the legal 
guardian or custodian of a victim who is a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-5-304, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-304; 2001, ch. 301, § 5. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted all of Subsection (1) after "if 
for "he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty"; added Subsection (2); 
and redesignated former Subsection (2) as (3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Elements. 
Kidnaping a minor. 
Liability of peace officer. 
Cited. 
ELEMENTS. 
For cases discussing definition and elements of former offense of false imprisonment, see Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 
106 P. 653, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1366 (1910); Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d400, 375 P.2d458 (1962). 
KIDNAPING A MINOR. 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Thorne. 
PER CURIAM: 
Randy Shea Gardner appeals his conviction of 
arranging for the distribution of a controlled substance. 
He asserts that his conviction should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a new trial because the record is 
insufficient for a meaningful appeal. He also argues that a 
jury instruction was in error. 
Criminal defendants have the right to a "record of 
sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of 
[their] claims." State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 241 
(Utah 1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
They do not, however, have a right to a perfect transcript. 
See id. Rather, the record must be adequate to allow 
meaningful judicial review. See id. 
"Due process requires that there be a [*2] record 
adequate to review specific claims of error already 
raised." West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UTApp 358, 
P 11, 993 P. 2d 252 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). Appellate courts will not presume error where a 
record is incomplete. See id. A lack of a complete record 
will be a "basis for remand and a new hearing only 
where: (1) the absence or incompleteness of the record 
prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other 
documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant timely 
requests the relevant portion of the record." Id. 
An incomplete record may necessitate a new trial 
where a defendant shows that a specific error is asserted 
and that the missing record was critical to its resolution. 
See State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). A defendant is not entitled to a new trial whenever 
there is a gap in the record, "just in case the missing 
record might reveal some error." Id. Rather, a showing of 
prejudice is required. See id. Gardner has not shown that 
the gap in the record has prejudiced him. 
Gardner asserts that the record on appeal is 
inadequate [*3] to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He argues 
that the absence of the cross-examination testimony of 
Leland Clark means that this court cannot review whether 
there was sufficient evidence to show the "lack of 
entrapment." However, the record on appeal is complete 
enough to determine whether Gardner freely and 
voluntarily committed the acts in question because the 
State's case-in-chief is complete and the missing 
testimony would, at most, be inconsistent or contrary 
evidence. 
A conviction may be overturned for insufficiency of 
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evidence only "when it is apparent that there is not 
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the 
crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, P 13, 25 P.3d 985 
(quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, "it is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Id. at P 16. 
"When reviewing a trial wherein conflicting competent 
evidence was presented, we simply assume that the jury 
believed the evidence supporting the verdict.'" Id. [*4] at 
P 14 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 
1993)). Ultimately, in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "so long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops." Id. at P 16. 
The record is complete enough to determine that the 
State presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that 
Gardner acted freely and voluntarily, and was not 
entrapped into committing the offense. The evidence 
showed that Gardner initiated the plan of bringing drugs 
into the prison, lacking only an outside supplier. Gardner 
demonstrated his willingness to participate in this 
enterprise. Kevin Pepper provided Gardner the 
opportunity to commit the offense by posing as an 
outside supplier, with Clark passing on certain contact 
information to Gardner. The phone conversations 
between Gardner and Pepper show no hesitation or 
confusion from Gardner in participating in a drug 
distribution agreement. 
Even assuming that Clark's cross-examination 
testimony supported Gardner's defense that he was 
entrapped into committing the offense due to concern for 
his own [*5] safety and concern for a friend's financial 
circumstances, the testimony would present only 
inconsistent evidence, which the jury obviously chose not 
to believe. There is testimony from Clark stating that 
Gardner initiated the idea of bringing drugs into prison, 
and testimony from Pepper regarding the further 
arrangements. Where conflicting evidence is presented at 
trial, appellate courts "simply assume that the jury 
believed the evidence supporting the verdict." Id. at P 14 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Given the 
evidence supporting the verdict, the presumption is that 
the jury simply did not give any significant weight to any 
possible testimony from Clark that would have supported 
entrapment. As a result, Gardner has not shown any 
prejudice due to the missing portion of the record. 
Gardner also argues that the missing testimony is 
necessary to identify any other possible errors at trial. 
However, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial 
whenever a gap in the record exists just in case the gap 
may contain some error. See State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 
557, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Gardner overstates 
Russell as mandating reversal where a record [*6] is 
incomplete. In fact, Russell held that an incomplete 
record does not on its own require a new trial. See id. 
The court noted that Utah law "does not require a 
complete record so appellate counsel can go fishing for 
error; it only requires that there be a record adequate to 
review specific claims of error already raised." Id. 
Gardner also asserts that the trial court erred in 
giving an instruction regarding the elements of 
entrapment. When challenging jury instructions on 
appeal, an appellant "cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that [appellant] led the trial court 
into committing the error." State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 
UT 16, P 9, 86 P. 3d 742 (quotations and citation 
omitted). As a result, a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error '"if counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, P 54, 70 P.3d 111). Counsel 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no 
objection to the specific instruction now appealed. Thus, 
Gardner is precluded from challenging this instruction 
[*7] on appeal. 
Accordingly, Gardner's conviction is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
